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Book Reviews
Consent and the Roots of Judicial Authority:
The Constitutional Writings of Archibald Cox
By Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.*
By Archibald Cox. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976. Pp. vii, 118.
$6.95.

THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT.

Archibald Cox had special reason, even beyond what he must have felt
because of his central role, for relief at President Nixon's capitulation to
public demand for compliance with the court order to produce the first nine
White House tapes. In a way that comes only to very few, Cox saw a
cornerstone of his work as a scholar put to the severest of tests in the world of
affairs-and proven sound. A basic theme in Cox's writings on constitutional
adjudication has been the necessity for substantial popular consent to the rule
of law and public insistence on its observance. The events that followed
President Nixon's dismissal of Cox as Special Prosecutor showed the
strength, possibly surprising to many, of this foundation.
I.

The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government

The aftermath of the "Saturday Night Massacre" is Professor Cox's
point of departure in his latest book, The Role of the Supreme Court in
American Government. In the book, a revised version of lectures delivered at
1
Oxford University in 1975, he proceeds from an account of the tapes impasse
to an inquiry into the "American people's attachment to constitutionalism"
that broke it. 2 He begins with a lucid pr6cis of Marbury v. Madison.3
Noting the lack of self-evident persuasiveness in the Court's opinion, Cox
emphasizes that the likelihood of successful defiance had the Court tried to
require the delivery of Marbury's commission makes the case no more than an
early seed of the judicial authoritativeness that brought President Nixon's
submission.4 Marbury'smere declaration of the principle of judicial supremacy in matters of constitutional adjudication did not secure the acceptance it
needed to be effective. The roots of acceptance took hold, in Cox's view,
* Associate Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A. 1964, Yale University; B.Phil. 1967,
Oxford University; J.D. 1970, Harvard University.
I. A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 3-8 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as ROLE].
2. Id. at 9.
3. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
4. See ROLE, supra note 1, at 9-16.
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mainly through the Court's success in performing the necessary function of
"umpire to resolve the conflicts engendered by our extraordinarily complex
system of government," 5 especially those between federal and state authority. 6 However central the Court's role as guarantor of human rights may have
become, it depended in large part on a halo effect: success as umpire between
levels and branches of government legitimated the authority of the Court as
constitutional expositor in general.7
A court so empowered may, however, find no clear limit to the exercise
of its authority, particularly if it believes that there can be constitutional rights
enforceable in court without explicit sanction from the Constitution's text.
Still, Cox sees this natural-law notion as one that has received considerable
acceptance throughout our history 8 and has been a secondary but important
force in the establishment of judicial supremacy. 9 The conflict between the
expanding boundaries of judicial authority and our national commitment to
popular sovereignty has caused acute tensions, especially concerning the
policymaking authority of elected legislatures. Cox briefly traces the patterns
of those tensions through the Court's pre-1937 economic activism, the
subsequent phase of judicial deference to the congressional will, and the
Warren Court's reemphasis of equality and civil liberties.'" This lightly
sketched history provides an introduction to fuller discussion of recent
decisions concerning freedom of expression, the right to privacy, and equal
protection, which Cox offers as examples of the Court's changing approach to
constitutional adjudication.
Much of this heavily trodden ground is only lightly touched in Cox's
book. As he makes explicit in the preface, he has revised only moderately his
Oxford lectures, which he intended for a largely nonspecialist audience
abroad. 1' The book thus mixes occasionally penetrating discussion with
elementary, although lucid and graceful, exposition and insightful but sometimes unintegrated observations.' 2 For example, the discussion of several
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 16.
See id. at 16-23.
See id. at 29-30.
See id. at 16, 30-32, 111-13. See generally Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitu-

tion?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 715-17 (1975).

9. See ROLE, supra note 1, at 16, 30, 32.
10.

Id. at 33-36.

11. Preface to id. at v-vi.
12. An irregularity of a different sort is the book's rambunctious typography. Inexcusable
proofreading errors, some of them fairly serious, abound. Analytically, the mistakes seem to fall
into three (not always mutually exclusive) categories:
1) The downright sloppy. See, e.g., id. at 69-70 (entire line of type belonging near
bottom of page 69 out of place near top of page 70); id. at 97 n.2 & 99 n. I (contents
should be exchanged). Compare, e.g., id. at vi, with id. at 36-37 n. 1 (different dates
given for publication of same book by Professor Black).
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recent first amendment decisions offers a telling, practical criticism of one
key underpinning of overbreadth scrutiny:
How many people likely to be involved in this class of cases read
the statutes and ordinances closely enough to be deterred from
constitutionally protected speech by an over-broad law, and then
follow the law reports with such care as to be reassured by a
Supreme Court decision declaring the law unconstitutional on its
face unless and until it is saved by a narrowing construction by the
State's highest tribunal?
And how many check for narrowing State
13
court interpretations?
Following this comment, however, Cox "wonders whether the entire doctrine is not built upon pretence [sic]" 14 -ignoring the support overbreadth
analysis draws from a quite practical danger he had just mentioned in
connection with prior restraints on demonstrations, 5 the opportunity for
16
discriminatory enforcement of overbroad laws.
In Professor Cox's examination of the cases, a recurring theme of
inquiry is the appropriateness of the Court's degree of activism. From his
discussion emerge several criteria: notably, the effect of the Court's decisions
on the workings of the political process, the Court's ability to articulate
workable principles, the practicality of decisions requiring complex rem2) Those possibly explainable if the proofreading was done in England (although
printed in the United States, the book was published by the Oxford University Press)
by persons quite unfamiliar with American life, law, history, and institutions. E.g., id.
at 40, 54, 84, 100-01 (persistent misspelling of Chief Justice's name as "Berger"); id. at
16 (reckoning of present time as "almost a century and a quarter later" than Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803)); id. at 96 n.2 (citation to vol. 493 of the
Federal Supplement, which should not appear until approximately 1980, for a case
decided by a United States Court of Appeals).
3) The somewhat amusing. E.g., id. at 72 n.4 ("The Supreme Court, 1971 Term:
Forward"); id. at 71 n. I ("Harper v. Board of Electronics").
13. Id. at 45.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 43-44.
16. See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844, 872
(1970). The cases that Cox discusses "to show how the doctrine of overbreadth can be run into
the ground," ROLE, supra note 1, at 45, although they may have concerned speech whose
suppression few would lament, nonetheless involved laws plainly offering ample room for
selective enforcement against protected expression. See Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901,
904 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting) (statute punishing, inter alia, " 'loud and offensive ...
language in any public . . . place,' " interpreted by state court to include speech " 'of such a
nature as to be likely. . . to affect the sensibilities of a hearer' "); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.
518, 519 (1972) ("opprobrious words or abusive language").
Moreover, Cox at best exaggerates his further complaint that the Court's overbreadth
decisions have not
given any sign that [the Court] has faced the problems of the draughtsmen and has
some notion of how to write a law which covers the endless variety of conduct that may
disturb public order or decency yet cannot be twisted to reach some constitutionally
protected form of expression.
ROLE, supra note 1, at 45. Although with varying degrees of emphasis, the Court has quite
consistently tried to strike down statutes only for substantialoverbreadth. See, e.g., Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615-16 & n.14 (1973); Note, supra, at 858-60, 918-23.
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edies, and the verdict of public opinion on the Court's work. To promote
openness in political discourse, activism in the service of free expression is
fully warranted: "To apply the philosophy of judicial self-restraint to the area
of speech and press would entrust those liberties to the substantially uncontrolled power of the individual States and the Congress." 17 In his view, the
Court has generally responded to this concern: "Taken as a whole, the free
speech decisions of the past twenty years have expanded liberty and
strengthened self-government." 18 Cox's sensitivity to the Court's impact on
the political process also contributes to his approval of the reapportionment
cases, which he sees as having "removed the chief remaining source of
political inequality in the United States and [given] impetus to other
correctives. ' 19
A venturesome Court, however, may intervene in areas in which it is not
prepared to articulate durable and workable principles. Such, for Cox, is the
case with the abortion decisions20 and several recent equal protection rulings
he considers of dubious reconcilability. 1 By contrast, though Cox does not
say so as explicitly as he might have, defense of the reapportionment cases
seems strengthened by the coherence and overall workability of the one
person, one vote principle the Court articulated. 22 Cox's point is not that the
Court should invariably avoid making new law that it has difficulty putting in
terms of coherent doctrine. Rather, the Court should proceed circumspectly if
17. ROLE, supra note 1, at 50.
18. Id. at 49. Cox's inclinations in approving or criticizing the Court's recent first amendment decisions are consistent with his emphasis on the relation between expression and the
political process. He most strongly endorses the public figure defamation and street demonstration cases, see id. at 38-42, 43-44, which involved expression suppressible only by eliminating
much from political discourse. For example, Cox mentions the crucially important Watergate
investigative reporting, which might well not have appeared under the standards prevailing
before New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See ROLE, supranote 1, at 40-41. He
questions the first amendment rulings that rejected state efforts to punish the use of vulgarities in
political expression. See id. at 44-48 (discussing Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972),
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972), and Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)). Here, he
seems to care little for the effect on liberty and much for "the level at which public discourse is
conducted," suggesting that state power "includes the preservation of dignity by barring words
spoken to be offensive, though not relevant to the issues." ROLE, supra note 1, at 47.
19. ROLE, supra note 1, at 69.
20. See id. at 51-55, 113-14.
21. See id. at 73-75.
22. See id.at 69,90-91. Somewhat puzzlingly, Cox is quite uncomfortable with the derivation
of the one person, one vote principle, while apparently untroubled by its articulation and
operation. He cites the reapportionment cases along with the abortion decisions as "dramatic
examples" of reading into the Constitution "notions of wise and fundamental policy which are
not even-faintly suggested by the words" of the document. Id. at 100. One can fairly suggest that
the phrase "equal protection of the laws" falls short of dictating the outcome of the reapportionment cases and further contend that the decisions appear to rest in considerable part on the
Justices' "notions of wise and fundamental policy." It seems simply wrong, however, given the
patent and statutorily sanctioned inequalities of representation that existed in our legislative
bodies, to suggest that the policy does not in the slightest follow from the text.
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it cannot articulate adequate principles; otherwise, it may undermine and
23
waste the support on which it depends.
Highly practical considerations also affect the wisdom of judicial
activism. The courts can, quite simply, place themselves in situations they
cannot manage, particularly in the framing of remedies. Cox speculates that
the anticipation of such problems, although unarticulated, lies behind the
Court's refusal to find a deprivation of equal protection in a state's basing
school finance on local property taxation. 24 In raising such problems of
remedies, Cox expands upon a theme of his earlier writing-the increasing
tendency of courts not just to protect the individual against governmental
action but also to enforce "the affirmative obligations of the government to its
citizens.'"2 Previously, he had said little of the practical difficulties created
by the Court's broadened role; still, as his analysis of the reapportionment
cases demonstrates, the difficulties are not always insuperable. Now, however, Cox adds that, although the school segregation cases may initially have
seemed to involve merely the overturning of Jim Crow laws, they rapidly
came to require the courts "to formulate controversial programmes of
affirmative action requiring detailed administration for protracted periods
under constant judicial supervision.' '26 As complex and controversial as
desegregation remedies may have become, nevertheless, the unacceptability
of constitutionalizing apartheid required the effort, which quite likely presented the only way to instill the conviction that "the constitutional promise
of equality was genuine and capable of realization."27 Beyond illustrating the
problem of affirmative duties and remedies, the book has little to offer here;
Cox concludes by observing merely, "Somehow constitutional law must
cope with the change. .

constitutionalism.

.

. This is the next great challenge of American

"28

23. See id. at 75.
24. Id. at 93-96 (discussing San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1(1973));
cf. Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (1976) (ordering closing of New Jersey public
schools unless legislature provides full funding to finance education system in manner held
mandated by State constitution). See also ROLE, supranote 1, at 82-83 (mentioning the complex
managerial problems involved in the multidistrict desegregation decree reversed in Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974)).
25. Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Society, 50 MARQ. L. REV. 575, 584
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Marquette Lecture]; see, e.g., A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT:
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF REFORM 35-39, 50 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
WARREN COURT]; Marquette Lecture, supra at 584-91; Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 TermForeword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REv.
91, 93 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Foreword].
26. ROLE, supra note 1, at 77.
27. Id.at 88; see id. at 117.
28. In his most recent article, Professor Cox has developed further his concern over
sweeping judicial remedies. He compares, for example, the pre-New Deal Court's "veto [of]
accommodations worked out through the political process" with the Boston desegregation
decrees' imposition "upon millions of people [of] a novel program of legislative character
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Cox does note that judicial ventures into the creation of affirmative
duties and remedies increase the "degree of judicial dependence upon
political support.' '29 He thus touches upon a fourth consideration in appraising activism: the need for social consensus or at least acquiescence to support
the judiciary's efforts. Here again, the reapportionment cases-successful at
least in winning public support and in proving workable in their implementation-can serve as a prime example of activism vindicated because the
Court "kn[e]w us better than we kn[e]w ourselves." 3 0 In contrast, the effort
to enforce the school desegregation decisions, however broad the present
acceptance of their basic holding, has subjected constitutional adjudication to
"strains never before experienced."31 Regard for social consensus may
counsel against judicial assertiveness in a different situation-when either
possible decision would likely receive acceptance, but the Constitution does
not clearly mandate either result. Cox seems to identify reverse discrimination as such a situation;3" he considers at some length the policy and
constitutional arguments on both sides and highlights the acute difficulty of
the problem for a court or an administrative or legislative policymaker. 33 As
matters stand, "[n]o one quite knows all the gains and costs of adopting
[reverse discrimination] remedies instead of leaving the obstacles to diminish
gradually once further discrimination is stopped. " 34 The unknown results
mandate, in Cox's view, a judicial deference that would not outlaw adminis35
trative and legislative experimentation.
Cox's attention to the Court's dependence on popular consent and his
willingness to justify decisions at least in part by their acceptance and effects
without popular representation," wondering whether "the modern Court [is] any less mistaken"
than its predecessor. Cox, The New Dimensions of ConstitutionalAdjudication, 51 WASH. L.
REV. 791, 815 (1976) [hereinafter cited as New Dimensions].
29. ROLE, supra note 1, at 88.
30. Id. at 117; New Dimensions, supra, note 28, at 816-17 (courts' "apparent success" at
novel judicial task of legislative apportionment). For less favorable views of the reapportionment
decisions and their effects, see A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

108-15, 151-61, 165-73 (1970); W. ELLIOTT, THE RISE OF GUARDIAN DEMOCRACY: THE SUPREME
COURT'S ROLE IN VOTING RIGHTS DISPUTES, 1845-1969, at 213-36 (1974).

31. ROLE, supra note 1, at 86; see id. at 86-90, 109. The intense reaction to the Court's
decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), makes Cox's "never before"
phrasing seem an instance of rhetorical excess. See, e.g., C. SWISHER, THE TANEY PERIOD
1836-64, at 631-32 (1974).
32. See generally DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (avoiding as moot any decision
whether state law school's admissions preference to minority applicants violates equal protection
clause); Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680
(state medical school's admissions preference to minority applicants violates federal equal
protection clause), petitionfor cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1976) (No. 76-811).
33. See ROLE, supra note 1, at 61-68.
34. Id. at 68.
35. Id. See generally Sandalow, RacialPreferencesin HigherEducation:PoliticalResponsibility and the JudicialRole, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1975).
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demonstrate that he does not consider constitutional adjudication to be strictly
confined by legalistic canons, either in practice or in theory. Explicitly
articulating this view, he opens his final lecture as follows:
That the Supreme Court plays a partly political role-that it
makes public policy under the doctrine of judicial review-is all too
obvious. That it is partly bound by law is equally obvious to anyone
who understands the self-discipline of the legal method. The hard
question is one of
degree: how large or small a political role should
36
the Court play?

He thus positions himself to criticize purist positions on either side. Cox
underscores the Court's political role with the slightly overstated observation
that certain decisions of the Burger Court, especially its abortion rulings,
indicate "that the new Justices will not revert to the philosophy of judicial
37
self-restraint when an existing rule offends their policy preferences."
Turning to those who would urge the Court "to carry out the policies it deems
desirable," 38 Cox states that judicial impartiality and fidelity to law must be
more than a myth-'"Law professors cannot keep a myth alive if political
scientists are able to expose the fiction because of their greater candour or
truer perception." 39 Moreover, the departure from impartiality entailed by
commitment to anything but the search for our society's fundamental constitutional values would carry with it a corrosive "degree of commitment
apart from merit.

"4°

Cox similarly rejects adherence to rigid legalism, for "law, to command
consent, must deserve it. '"41 Unwillingness to depart from "constitutional
adjudication . . . sanctioned by the strict judicial method," Cox implies,

would have left American constitutional law much less deserving of the
people's support:
[W]e should still be tolerating a caste system and suffering the
inequity of legislative malapportionment. The press would be
constrained by fear of suits for libel or prosecutions for contempt of
court in publishing discreditable news of public figures; and in
some States poor persons charged with crime
42 would still be forced
to trial without the assistance of counsel.
He is, moreover, quite reconciled to judicial reliance on values not explicitly
written into the text of the Constitution:
36. ROLE, supra note 1, at 99.
37. Id. at 102.
38. Id. at 106.
39. Id. at 107.
40. Id. See also New Dimensions, supra note 28, at 821-22 (threat to longrun effectiveness of
constitutional adjudication from focus on shortrun benefits of results of Court's decisions).
41. ROLE, supra note 1, at 110.
42. Id. at 115.
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All agree that the [due process] clause calls for some measure of
judicial review of legislative enactments, and from that point
forward all must be done by judicial construct with no real guidance
from the document. .

.

.The Court's persistent resort to notions

of substantive due process for almost a century attests the strength
of our natural law inheritance in constitutional adjudication,
and I
43
think it unwise as well as hopeless to resist it.
Nevertheless, Cox criticizes an excessive concern solely for policy results,
stressing both the need to give "great weight" to a "clear-cut line of
precedents"' and the necessity for principled articulation. The result of
Cox's criticisms of the political and legalist approaches to constitutional
adjudication is a synthesis accepting major elements of both views-and
perhaps most notably, recognizing the validity of many conventional rules of
judicial restraint while rejecting the most fundamental rule, limitation to
values explicitly recognized in the constitutional text.
II.

Cox's Theory of Constitutional Adjudication

The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government reflects more
than it develops Cox's overall approach to constitutional adjudication, an
approach which can be pieced together from his several published lectures
and occasional articles on constitutional law over the past fifteen years.
Despite his renown and almost unfailing felicity of expression, this significant body of work has gone insufficiently appreciated, no doubt largely
because Cox has not yet attempted a single unified presentation.
Countless writers have commented on the judiciary's need for popular
assent, but for Professor Cox that need is a central theme affecting nearly all
aspects of his outlook. 45 He specifically finds inadequate, at least standing by
43. Id. at 113. Professor Cox would not limit the Court's reference to sources beyond the
text to "substantive" adjudication under the due process clauses, for he recognizes the essential
similarity of what the courts do under other provisions as well. See id. at 72 ("the questions of
judicial philosophy which [recent activist equal protection] cases raise are the same as those
posed when the Due Process Clause is invoked to protect personal liberties not specifically
mentioned in the Bill of Rights"); id. at 113 (the Constitution does not "suggest restrained review
in some cases and strict review in others"); cf. id. at 49 ("balancing opposing values" in recent
free speech cases similar to that in pre-1937 economic activism).
Cox acknowledges that the natural-law strain in our constitutional history, legitimating
reliance on sources not in or closely related to the text, has appeared in "different intellectual
trappings and under other names." Id. at 32. He does not identify one intriguing characteristic of
his modern version, which in one sense stands the old idea of natural law on its head. Formerly,
natural law enforceable in constitutional adjudication would, as some saw it, "impose laws even
on the Deity," Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 143 (1810) (Johnson, J., concurring), see
ROLE, supra note, I, at 32, and presumably on a resistant society as well. In Cox's framework,
however, principles not accepted by or at least acceptable to society could not properly be part of
"natural law" since "[t]he aspirations voiced by the Court must be those the community is willing
not only to avow but in the end to live by." Id. at 117-18.
44. ROLE, supra note 1,at I 1l.
45. Cox has treated this theme time and time again, as in a lecture delivered a decade ago: "It
is the capacity to command free assent that makes law a substitute for power. The force of
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themselves, other possible foundations for judicial authority-including
adherence to a written charter, 46 judicial craftsmanship, 7 and, most emphatically, the threat of force on a large scale. 4 8 Of course, all democratic
institutions rest in large part, and one hopes ultimately, on the consent of the
governed; but courts are uniquely dependent on earning and holding popular
support since "[tihey possess neither the purse nor the sword" 4 9 and their
"decrees draw no authority from the participation of the people."50
Cox's view of consent holds striking implications for judicial activism.
To maintain the assent on which it depends, the judiciary must perform
largely in accordance with a complex set of expectations. Prominent among
these is the public's demand for results it believes to be just;5 I adjudication
must take account of the "moral sense of civilization" to enable the law to
"meet the needs of men and match their ethical sensibilities.' '52 This
approach entails accepting the notion of substantive due process 53 since the
limited enumerations of the Constitution obviously will not always incorpolegitimacy - and conversely the habit of voluntary compliance-is the foundation of the law's
civilizing and liberalizing influence." MarquetteLecture, supranote 25, at 575-76. Seealso, e.g.,
ROLE, supra note 1, at 2, 7, 103-05; WARREN COURT, supra note 25, at 25-26.
The public assent to which Cox refers appears multifaceted or perhaps even as several
different phenomena. Most commonly, he seems to mean the voluntary compliance with court
decisions that flows from acceptance of the general legitimacy of the judicial role even when
there is disagreement with a particular decision. See, e.g., ROLE, supranote 1, at 103-04. Second,
he seems to have in mind a willingness to accept the main thrust of the Court's decisions. When
acceptance falters, the Court may well, in the long run, change directions. Seetext accompanying
notes 127-31, 134-35 infra.Finally, there exists the rare instance such as the Watergate tapes "fire
storm," in which the public made clear its insistence on obedience to a judicial mandate, see, e.g.,
ROLE, supra note I, at 8, 104, or presumably when adverse reaction to a court decision becomes
strong enough to precipitate a constitutional crisis, see, e.g., note 31 supra.
46. See ROLE, supra note I, at 2.
47. See Cox, Chief Justice Earl Warren, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Chief Justice Earl Warren].
48. See, e.g., ROLE, supra note I, at 7, 103; Marquette Lecture, supra note 25, at 575-76.
49. ROLE, supra note I, at 7.
50. Foreword, supra note 25, at 98. Cox is not so naive as to postulate a nation of
Court-watchers; the Court's constituency is made up of "many voices, not all carrying equal
weight." ROLE, supranote 1, at 105. The Court does not require universal support, but it does
need acceptance by "the political branches of government, the rest of the legal profession, and
enough of the public," id. at 2, that what it is doing "is 'legitimate,' and therefore deserves an
uncoerced consent," New Dimensions, supra note 28, at 822.
51. In responding to this demand, the Court may not always rely on strict adherence to law,
see, e.g., WARREN COURT, supra note 25, at 5, or await reform by the political branches, see, e.g.,
id. at 117-18.
52. ROLE, supra note 1, at 110; see Cox, Understanding the Supreme Court, 2 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 136, 145 (1962) (higher community valuation justifies greater constitutional and
judicial protection) [hereinafter cited as Understandingthe Supreme Court].
53. See ROLE, supra note 1, at 113. Cox quite clearly is not driven by sympathy with Warren
Court decisions to rationalize a doctrine he rejected in times of less congenial results. Writing
during the tenure of Chief Justice Vinson, Cox explicitly called for application of substantive due
process standards to bans on strikes shortly after the Court had emphatically rejected the
substantive due process approach in an attack on antilabor state legislation in Lincoln Fed. Labor
Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525,533-37 (1949). See Cox, Strikes, Picketing
and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REv. 574, 580-81, 588-89 (1951).
HeinOnline -- 55 Tex. L. Rev. 171 1976-19772
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rate the values pressing for judicial recognition; therefore, judicially articulated "principles need not be neutral." 54 It justifies preferring rights that
society deems especially important55 and "inescapably requires the Court to
consider the social, economic, and policy consequences of its decisions. "56
Consequently, the Court may act as modernizer of the law "to serve the new
and newly felt needs of the community," 57 possibly even to the point of the
judge's explicitly approaching "constitutional adjudication as an instrument
of reform." 58 The Court need not merely reflect society's mores; its relationship with the public is one of mutual influence, involving a role of some
leadership for the Court in forming the consensus on which it depends. "It
59
shapes as well as expresses our national ideals.'
The need to consider social values and the effects of the apparent
ratification that can flow from judicial inaction 61 imply that the Court may
redress a failure of the other branches to act on matters normally within their
competence. 6' In its most extended and perhaps least readily acceptable
implication, Cox's approach not merely tolerates, but mandates "the occasional great leaps forward which lack

.

.

.

justification" from "principles

referable to accepted sources of law.'"62 Although a foundation in traditional
63
sources of law is a necessary staple in the diet of constitutional adjudication,

54. Cox, The Role of Congressin ConstitutionalDeterminations,
40 U. CIN. L. REV. 199, 221
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Role of Congress].
55. See Understandingthe Supreme Court, supra note 52, at 145; cf. Role of Congress,supra
note 54, at 220 (emphasizing greater fitness of judiciary than of political branches to protect
preferred rights).
56. Marquette Lecture, supra note 25, at 578. But cf. id. at 581:
At the same time [the Court's] constitutional function, defined by history as well as the
implications of the document, is to decide whether the exercise of. . . national power
[in the Voting Rights Act] disturbs the frame of government erected in 1789 as modified
by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments ...
Cox also notes:
The extraordinary character of the questions put before the Court means that the Court
cannot ignore the political aspects of its task-the public consequences of its decisions
-yet the answer to the question "what substantive result is best for the country?" is
often inconsistent with the responses obtained by asking "what is the decision
according to law?" The Court may incline to one direction or the other, but no one
could wisely and permanently grasp either horn of the dilemma.
WARREN COURT, supra note 25, at 4-5.
57. Foreword, supra note 25, at 98; cf. Understandingthe Supreme Court, supra note 52, at
137.
58. ROLE, supra note I, at 112.
59. Foreword, supra note 25, at 97; see ROLE, supra note 1, at 117-18; Role of Congress,
supra note 54, at 260-61 ("the Court can assist [the people] in the process of education [from the
experience of self-government] by evening out the excessive swings in popular emotion and
reminding us all of our better judgment").
60. See, e.g., WARREN COURT, supra note 25, at 119; Foreword, supra note 25, at 97-98.
61. See, e.g., ROLE, supra note I, at 68-69; WARREN COURT, supra note 25, at 117-18;
Foreword, supra note 25, at 122.
62. WARREN COURT, supra note 25, at 21.
63. Id. at 119; see Chief Justice Earl Warren, supra note 47, at 2.
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[i]mportant legal principles, both constitutional and other, have
often been created by a judicial coup de main. There are times, as
all lawyers know, when new legal norms may be made to embody
our ideals rather than measure our shortcomings-to project the
direction of American life rather than record it. 64
This enumeration may seem to reduce to the vanishing point the distance
between Cox's approach and the views of constitutional adjudication he has
criticized as too political and "manipulative. "65 Certainly, he would often
allow the courts greater latitude than would theories holding illegitimate any
decisions not demonstrably grounded in constitutional text, history, or
precedent. Nevertheless, the need to maintain the links between constitutional decisions and social consensus imposes its own limits. Often grounding
his reasoning in the Court's need for public assent, Cox has recognized the
validity of a quite comprehensive range of constraints on judicial power
arising from the public's confining expectations of judicial behavior as well as
doctrinal and practical considerations. We want our courts to act in accordance with some general notions of the appropriate scope of judicial authority;
it would become intolerable if a freewheeling judiciary tried on a wide and
regular basis to act as policymaker for a people accustomed to the notion that
66
they govern.
One could recognize restraints, of course, and still hold a powermaximizing, manipulative view of the judicial function. Cox, though, is not
at all a cynic who believes that courts should exercise all the power they can
wield limited only by their appraisal of the real political limits. Instead, he has
described the apparent and largely self-imposed outer limits on the Supreme
Court: it "is limited in its interpretation of the Constitution only by its own
self-restraint in responding to tradition, public pressure, and the claims of
conscience in the performance of a judicial office.' '67 He has gone on, within
that outer boundary, to formulate an elaborate scheme of appropriate
restraints, animated by the general principle that
the power of legitimacy is thought to depend largely upon the
realization that the major influence in a decision is not personal fiat,
but principles which bind the judges as well as the litigants, and
which apply
uniformly to all men not only today but yesterday and
tomorrow. 6
64. WARREN COURT, supra note 25, at 119; see ROLE, supra note 1, at 110:
There have always been occasions when the courts. . . have had to pay the price of
revealing that judges sometimes make law to suit the occasion. Nor should we forget
that not to pay that price may even defeat the object of obtaining voluntary compliance, because law, to command consent, must deserve it.
65. See ROLE, supra note 1, at 106-08.
66. Cf. Understanding the Supreme Court, supra note 52, at 137-38 (public acceptance of the
Court depends upon ideal that it applies the law rather than makes policy).
67. ROLE, supra note 1, at 13.
68. Id. at 109; see Understanding the Supreme Court, supra note 52, at 137-38.
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The careful reader will already have caught the qualifiers-'"thought to
depend," "largely," "major influence"; as Cox has said, the Court "is
partly bound by law.' '69 Perhaps only partly, but bound it is.70
Professor Cox proposes three occasionally overlapping types of limitsthose of judicial competence, sources from which to derive guides to
decision, and articulation of principles. Most are familiar; their importance
here lies in how they derive from and relate to the rest of Cox's view. Under
the rubric of competence constraints, which function both doctrinally and
practically, Cox seems to accept the general outline of the law based upon the
article III requirement of a cage or controversy 7' and the political question
doctrine. 72 Related to the latter is Cox's emphasis on appropriate deference to
the political branches for reasons of both legitimacy and practicality. "A
legislative enactment establishing new standards for the promotion of human
rights will command more acceptance, once stamped with the judicial
imprimatur of constitutionality, than novel doctrine enunciated by the
Court," since "[j]udge-made law draws no authority from the participation
of the people." ' 73 The representative nature of the legislative branch fits it
better than the judiciary to resolve "issues involving the accommodation of
the direct interests of large groups of people." 74 The courts' general lack of
the other branches' specialized experience and capacity to make findings of
social conditions 75 provides a different, highly pragmatic reason for deference. Other areas, such as review of Presidential decisions on the use of the
armed forces abroad, may pose insuperable difficulties in determining
76
judicially manageable standards.
Cox has, moreover, consistently stressed the importance for public
acceptance that the Court's decisions "be rooted in a continuous community
of principle found in the words of the constitution, judicial precedents,
69. ROLE, supra note 1,at 99 (emphasis added).
70. See id. at 107 (impossibility of keeping "the 'myth of the Court' alive without living by it
enough of the time to give it some reality").
71. See id. at 18, 28; Understandingthe Supreme Court, supra note 52, at 148-50.
72. See Understandingthe Supreme Court,supra note 52, at 150-52. The degree of apparent
acceptance of the political question doctrine is qualified by Cox's position that inaction by the
other branches can justify judicial intervention. See text accompanying notes 60-61 supra.
73. WARREN COURT, supra note 25, at 67-68.
74. ROLE, supra note 1,at 88; see Role of Congress, supra note 54, at 210-11:
75. See Role of Congress, supra note 54, at 205, 209-10; Foreword, supra note 25, at 105
(importance of legislators' knowledge that is not necessarily reflected in formal record); cf.
WARREN COURT, supra note 25, at 90 (acting on insufficient information can inappropriately
freeze judicial preconceptions into constitutional law). But see Chayes, The Role of the Judge in
PublicLaw Litigation,89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1308 (1976) ("unsuspected advantages" of courts
"in gathering and assessing information" in complex public law cases).
76. See ROLE, supra note 1, at 28; Role of Congress, supra note 54, at 204. See also text
accompanying notes 24-28 supra (concern for possible complexity of remedies).
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constitutional practice and like sources of law." 7 7 He has apparently never
enumerated the accepted sources of law in less vague and open-ended
fashion; his discussions of those sources that he has mentioned afford some
but not much help. The weight accorded to precedent, for example, "should
be so great-I think-as to outweigh the arguments for change unless one is
pretty clear that the change is impelled by one of the deeper lasting currents of
human thought that give direction to the law."78 As for the words of the
Constitution, "they are binding," presumably when clear and applicable, yet
seldom do they apply so plainly and specifically as to be dispositive. 79 When
reliance on the words fails, Cox's attachment to the constitutional text seems
to amount only to a reluctance "to ignore all constitutional charts" 80 and an
inclination to connect his reasoning, however tenuously, to a particular
provision 8' rather than trying to extrapolate a principle from several clauses at
82
once.
Perhaps Cox's most rigorous constraint is that the Court should make
manifest the grounding of its decisions in conventional sources of law and
articulate the reasons for its rulings in principled generalizations. The
articulation constraint looks backward at "accepted sources of. law" 83 and
ahead towards the quality of the principles articulated. The aim is formulation
of "a precept of sufficient abstractness to lift the ruling above the level of a
political judgment," 84 a principle at a high enough "level of generality" and
"degree of absoluteness." 8 1 Observing these restraints is not just an
academic nicety; referring to "that mysterious process by which decisions
meet new needs yet are shown to have the legal roots needed to maintain the
rule of law," Cox writes, "A chief function of the judicial opinion is to
preserve this element in the Court's power to command the consent of the
governed."'86

This scheme, juxtaposing the legitimation of sweeping authority against
several confining restraints, results in a delicate balance. Despite all the
restraints, Professor Cox grants his Court considerable leeway. He plainly
approves of the main thrusts of the desegregation, reapportionment, public
figure defamation, and right-to-counsel decisions, all of which he neverthe77.
sources
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

MarquetteLecture, supra note 25, at 587; see ROLE, supra note 1, at 75 ("conventional
of law"), 109 ("accepted sources of law"); Foreword, supra note 25, at 98.
ROLE, supra note 1, at I11.
Understandingthe Supreme Court, supra note 52, at 137.
See WARREN COURT, supra note 25, at 133.
SeeROLE, supra note 1,at 113.
See WARREN COURT, supra note 25, at 132-33.
Foreword, supra note 25, at 98; see Chief Justice Earl Warren, supra note 47, at 2.
ROLE, supra note 1, at 113.
Role of Congress, supra note 54, at 221.
Foreword, supra note 25, at 98; see WARREN COURT, supra note 25, at 48-49.
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less sees as departures "not sanctioned by the strict judicial method.' '87 Yet
his restraints have bite: in the abortion cases he seems to find the result
impossible to reach on his canons and the opinions utterly deficient in the
derivation and articulation of their rulings. 88 Interestingly, he also expresses
doubt about Mapp v. Ohio,89 even though he agrees with the result on policy
grounds; he concedes the force of the arguments on both sides and hints that
the weight of precedent might have been great enough "to outweigh the
90
arguments for change."
Finally, Cox's analysis of the Court's error in its pre-1937 economic
activism is especially illustrative. He could not and does not, consistently
with his position on substantive due process, 9 1 make the usual objection that
92
the Court illegitimately read into the Constitution values not found there.
For Cox, the Court did something arguably appropriate, but did it wrongly.
Although the Court may take social values into account, in those decisions it
simply misread them by failing "to perceive the changes in American
society." 93 Furthermore, it ventured beyond its competence: "[o]ne wonders
whether [the Justices] were not also wrong in thinking that issues involving
the accommodation of the direct interests of large groups of people are fit for
judicial resolution." 94 Finally, it violated the canon of principled generalization by approving some justifications for legislative interference with liberty
of contract and denying others:
[T]he Court would have stood on more defensible ground.

.

. if

it

had consistently maintained the proposition that the constitutional
guarantee against deprivation of liberty without due process
of law
95
precludes any interference with liberty of contract.
III.

Some Observations in Appraisal

Is Cox's hybrid theory a contradictory jumble or a coherent synthesis of
contending approaches to constitutional adjudication? Three observations
suggest that at least an overall unity exists in the scheme. First, the restraints
Cox advocates do not stand in stony resistance to his justifications for

87. See ROLE, supra note 1, at 115.
88. See id.at 113-14.
89. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (overruling refusal to apply fourth amendment exclusionary rule to
states).
90. See ROLE, supra note 1, at 11 & n. 1.
91. See text accompanying notes 43 & 53 supra.
92. See generally, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920 (1973). Compare id. with ROLE, supra note 1, at 112-13.
93. ROLE, supra note 1, at 88.
94. Id.
95. Role of Congress, supra note 54, at 210.
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activism. Rather, the restraints themselves often rest on the same underlying
considerations that support broad judicial authority. Similarly, the qualifications to the restraints flow from the same sources. Although he would
presumably not disagree with them, Professor Cox does not, for example,
rehearse the usual arguments for stare decisis, such as stability in the law and
expectation interests. Instead, he includes precedent among the accepted
96
sources of law upon which the Court must draw to maintain its legitimacy.
And the weight that can tip the scales against precedent is the sort of deeply
rooted value that he perceives to be an appropriate influence on the Court's
direction. 97 Second, he often frankly acknowledges major unresolved tensions, 98 but their persistence does not imply incoherence. Instead, legitimate,
competing interests are a part of Cox's framework-for example, the most
basic conflict occurs when a Justice concludes that a decision according to
strict legality would hurt the country. For Cox, the appropriate resolution to
such dilemmas comes through case-by-case decisions and not through the
categorical choice of one approach. 99
Third, Cox's tolerance of principles not neutrally derived or articulated °° might seem at war with his insistence on judicial impartiality and
independence.10 1 Even if one disagrees with Cox's position on neutral
principles, it does not follow that Cox's view cannot logically or practically
coexist with principled articulation and impartial application of judicial
doctrine. It does not seem unrealistic for a judge to believe, on the one hand,
that social values may provide one source for rules of decision and, on the
other, both that he should hesitate to go forward if a principled rationalization
seems unavailable and that he must not apply the law in any spirit of
favoritism. Common-law judges, after all, have worked that way for
02
generations.
In one sense, criticism of contradictions in Cox's outlook would be
beside the point. He is pragmatic almost to a fault, and often the most serious
charge sustainable against him would be candor in describing judicial reality.
He recognizes, for example, the significance of "halo effects' '--thatpublic
respect for the Court's decisions in one field of law or its general legalistic
comportment can foster public acceptance of the Court's venturing into other
fields of law or departing from strict canons. 10 3 Some of the reasons he gives
96. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
97. See text accompanying notes 78, 89-90 supra.
98. See, e.g., WARREN COURT, supra note 25, at 4-5; Understanding the Supreme Court,
supra note 52, at 137-38.
99. See WARREN COURT, supra note 25, at 5.
100. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
101. See, e.g., ROLE, supra note 1, at 107, 109.
102. See generally, e.g., B. CARDOZO, THE NATUREOFTHE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98-141 (1921).
103. See note 70 & text accompanying notes 5-7, supra;WARREN COURT, supranote 25, at 2 1.
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for judicial deference to more competent branches are highly practical ones,
recognizing the courts' limited experience and fact-finding capacity. 104 He
believes the Warren Court's sensitivity to "the best and truest aspirations of
the American people" to have been "infinitely more important" than the
craftsmanship of its opinions. 105 Further, he explicitly cites the need for
pragmatic "play in the joints" in justifying judicial intervention when the
06
other branches have failed to act.1
Nevertheless, Cox's emphases are strongly moral as well as practical,
his approach normative as well as descriptive. For all his pragmatism, he is no
cynical advocate of judicial realpolitik. 10 7 One of the Court's great functions
is helping "to make us what we are by telling us what we may be" and
"reminding us of our better selves."' 1 8 For the Court to perform this role
properly, Cox has repeatedly acknowledged that it must discern accurately
those strongly felt and broadly accepted social norms on which it may rely:
The Court must know us better than we know ourselves ...
[T]he roots of its decisions must be already in the nation. The
aspirations voiced by the Court must be those the community is
willing not only to avow but in the end to live by. For the power of
the great constitutional decisions rests upon the accuracy of the
Court's perception of this kind of common will ...
On the vital question of how the Court can hope to perform this essential
work properly, Cox's approach seems weakest or, at any rate, least adequately developed. It is plain from the pre- 1937 economic activism cases that
the Court can misperceive the "common will" for a long time. Even an
acceptable theory of how the Court can sense the actual or potential consensus
on which it may rely probably cannot escape an unsatisfying level of
generality; and even a good theory would afford no certainty against bad
practice. Nevertheless, before we accept the legitimacy of so major an
addition to "conventional sources of law," should not the means of ascertaining social norms be clear enough to justify hope for accuracy at least most of
the time? One can even agree that "the Warren Court did it and the heavens

104. See sources cited notes 75-76 supra.
105. Chief Justice Earl Warren, supra note 47, at 3.
106. Ste ROLE, supra note 1, at 68-69; WARREN COURT, supra note 25, at 117-18.
107. See. e.g., ROLE, supra note 1, at 107:
At the core of the Court's strength is [sic] impartiality and independence, and the
Justices' freedom from every form of commitment or self-interest. I am not speaking
only of freedom from the crasser forms of obligation and ambition, but of a cast of
mind free so far as humanly possible from the ties of personal and group loyalties and
implied commitments.

108. Id. at 117.
109. Id. at 117-18; see WARREN COURT, supra note 25, at 119; Role of Congress,supra note
54, at 220.
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did not fall," 10 but still feel uneasy about chartering the Court to try it on a
regular basis.
Having emphasized the importance of the Court's accurately perceiving
social values, Cox remains extraordinarily vague about how it can ensure that
accuracy. The "great judge," according to Cox, should be able to discover
the community's "ulterior values" through "the sensitive reading of history
and appreciation of the current condition of the community." 1 ' Strong
precedent should fall only if "one is pretty clear that the change is impelled by
one of the deeper lasting currents of human thought that give direction to the
2

law.""1

But Cox's own vagueness neither means that some greater clarity is
impossible nor leaves his structure unable to stand for want of a keystone. An
example of a more developed exposition is Dean Kadish's exhaustive article
on procedural due process methodology, in which he classified and criticized
the sources from which the Court has attempted to discern fundamental
principles of justice and proposed others in their place. 113 From Cardozo and
Frankfurter down to the present, some Justices have made explicit their effort
to ascertain social mores, relying on such sources as patterns in case law
development and trends in legislation. 114 Although any detailed explication is
beyond this review, the examples of others indicate that an approach
including judicial reference to social mores can be a viable one.
Even if the Court can discern society's important values accurately
enough, there remains a tension between its role as interpreter of a document
110. Wright, ProfessorBickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 769, 805 (1971).
111. Chief Justice Earl Warren, supra note 47, at 3.
112. ROLE, supra note 1, at 111. Of course, Cox is not the only writer who has taken refuge in
eloquent vagueness when confronted with the difficulty of describing how judges can reliably
ascertain social mores. See B. CARDOZO, supranote 102, at 113: "If you ask me how [the judge] is
to know when one interest outweighs another, I can only answer that he must get his knowledge
just as the legislator gets it, from experience and study and reflection; in brief, from life itself."
113. Kadish, Methodology and Criteriain Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957). Kadish's ultimate conclusion rejects, for procedural due process
adjudication, the effort to ascertain established moral judgments, but not on grounds of
unfeasibility. He proposes instead an inquiry based on purposes he ascribes to the due process
clauses and efforts to determine whether challenged procedures serve those purposes. His article
illustrates the possibility of the kind of analysis needed to meet the problem of vagueness
discussed in the text. See also Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestion for the Revival of
Substantive Due Process, 1975 Sup. CT. REv. 261, 279-80, 287-88. For discussion of Kadish's
objections to reference to social values, see note 121 & text accompanying notes 117-25 infra.
114. See Kadish, supra note 113, at 326 (Cardozo & Frankfurter); Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct.
2909, 2928-29 (1976) (plurality opinion by Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.). The Justices in Gregg
cited the legislative enactments in response to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), a
statewide referendum on the death penalty, and the trend in jury verdicts under post-Furman
statutes. Cf. Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586, 2604 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("For the
Court now to overrule [a particular statutory interpretation]. . . .would be so clearly contrary
to my understanding of the mores of today that I think the Court is entirely correct in adhering to
[the earlier interpretation]").
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guaranteeing basic liberties and our society's commitment to majoritarianism. From this conflict there arise cogent objections to the Court's relying on
values from outside the constitutional text. The Court might be either too
swayed by public opinion or too independent of it. On the one hand, although
Cox ostensibly offers a charter for a degree of activism, a Court seeking to
incorporate social mores might confuse strong but transitory feeling with
deeply rooted consensus, temporizing too readily even concerning the
explicitly recognized rights it should defend from majority onslaught. It
might, in addition, yield to a longer-run consensus that fatally undermined
constitutional protections. On the other hand, the arguments are several and
familiar that allowing courts to reach beyond their written charters is
incompatible with democracy. A grant of such latitude engenders several
dangers. It exposes judges, who are human and often have backgrounds of
significant political activity, to the temptation to reach beyond even the
various theories of limited activism. It allows, moreover, the making of
policy or even the effective amending of the Constitution by unsanctioned
processes extraordinarily difficult to reverse. Finally, one may object, it
affords no answer to a challenge to the Court's legitimacy from one who
disagrees with its value choices.
Cox would plainly have no patience with a Court inclined to retreat in the
face of popular hysteria; he sees the Court as "a check that will preserve
continuity and enforce more enduring values" instead of responding to
"shortrun pressures." 115 His recognition of the appropriate roles of applicable text and the weight of precedent" 16 reinforces this view and leaves his
approach only minimally vulnerable to criticism for susceptibility to momentary passions. More serious is the objection that Dean Kadish posed to any
"technique of constitutional due process adjudication that resorts to the
preformed moral judgments of others." '17 A constitutional rule so derived
8
has lost "any independent integrity as a governing normative principle." "
Anything goes; "all that counts in the end is whether it is accepted." ' " 19
Principles are consigned to "complete moral relativity" 1 20 because an
underlying premise of that approach is "the complete subjectivity of all moral
12 1
judgments.'
115. See Role of Congress, supra note 54, at 220.
116. See text accompanying notes 78-82 supra.
117. Kadish, supra note 113, at 345.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. This discussion does not imply that Dean Kadish would necessarily subscribe to the
generalization of his argument beyond the procedural due process context, nor does the argument
in text necessarily dispute his critique of relativist approaches to procedural due process
adjudication. Exclusive reliance on "the preformed moral judgments of others" could indeed
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Cox's writings do not, however, reveal a moral relativist. He is fond of
quoting Lord Radcliffe on the role of the law in vindicating "a sense of right
and wrong that is not merely provisional nor just the product of a historical
process." 122 One need not share Cox's somewhat optimistic attitude nor
resolve the large and fundamental philosophical issues it raises to conclude
that relativism does not fatally flaw his theory. Because he accords the Court a
role in shaping as well as reflecting society's value consensus,1 23 it can hope
to prevent the sort of degeneration that would leave it with only impoverished
values upon which to draw. Again, the restraints imposed by text, precedent,
and history should make decline beyond some minimum levels at least quite
difficult and unlikely. 124 Nevertheless, a more basic response to the threat of
declining judicial standards in a society of degenerating values is that
deterioration seems inevitable no matter what one's theory of appropriate
sources for judicial values and principles if the change in social standards is
deep and long-lasting. The political appointment process would eventually
yield a Court unsympathetic to the old principles and inclined to erode them.
The ultimate determinant, in other words, will be the standards by which the
society is willing to live.J25
Even without such massive social changes, ihere remains the question
whether judges, if empowered to tell society what they perceive its contemporary standards to be, would generally have the humility and perspective to
avoid consciously imposing their own values, or unconsciously and too
readily finding their values "shared" by society as a whole. For example,
would a Mr. Justice Cox have been able to refrain from casting the deciding
vote in favor of Mapp v. Ohio?126 Or could a judge acting on Cox's principles,
finding his views wholly at variance with what he had to concede was a broad
consensus, be expected to act against his own convictions? No confident
empty proceduraldueprocess of independent content, making at least theoretically possible the
nullification of an explicit constitutional guarantee. If substantivedue process, by contrast, is to
have any role in constitutional adjudication, it can only result from recognition of constitutional
protection for rights and interests not specifically mentioned. Basing its content on social mores
does not threaten anything already in the Constitution and seems at least preferable by anyone's
standard to the only apparent alternative, the individual value preferences of the Justices
themselves.
122. See ROLE, supra note 1,at 112; Chief Justice Earl Warren, supra note 47, at 2-3. Both
quote C. RADCLIFFE, THE LAW AND ITS COMPASS 78 (1960).
123. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
124. Cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2925 (1976) (plurality opinion by Stewart, Powell &
Stevens, JJ.): "[O]ur cases. . . make clear that public perceptions of standards of decency with
respect to criminal sanctions are not conclusive. A penalty must also accord with 'the dignity of
man,' which is the 'basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment.' "
125. Cf. Hand, The Contributionof an IndependentJudiciaryto Civilization,in THE SUPREME
JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS 1692-1942, at 66 (Mass. Bar Ass'n ed. 1942) ("a society so
riven that the spirit of moderation is gone, no court can save") (emphasis in original).
126. See text accompanying notes 89-90 supra.
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answer about such mysteries of human nature seems possible, but the
tradition of judicial impartiality runs deep. Although some judges would lack
the temper necessary to keep them from serious error, the restraints Cox
advocates plus the need to muster a majority of a collegial Court should
greatly reduce the chance of major abuses.
There may still, of course, occur the momentous mistake, the failure of
discernment, articulation, and persuasion, the occasion when somehow the
Court goes astray from the criterion that "the roots of its decisions must be
already in the nation." 127 Most would now agree that this happened prior to
1937 in the economic due process cases. Because Cox rests his theory on
popular assent to the overall thrust of the Court's work, he can say that such
"judgments will surely yield, as they yielded in that instance, to the slow
pressures of unfolding history." '1 28 Indeed, the Court has recently demonstrated that in the face of strong and clear indications of popular consensus,
the judiciary need not greatly delay its response. As the plurality stated in the
recent decision upholding the constitutionality of capital punishment:
[D]evelopments during the four years since Furman[v. Georgia129]
have undercut substantially the assumptions upon which [the
"standards of decency"] argument rested. .

.

. [I]t is now evident

that a large proportion of American society continues to regard
[capital punishment]
as an appropriate and necessary criminal
130
sanction.
The cruel and unusual punishment clause131 may be unique in the degree to
which it calls for reference to social value judgments, but the recent decisions
interpreting it do further demonstrate that the Court can identify and rely upon
132
indications of a public consensus.
In articulating the role such a consensus can play in constitutional
adjudication, Professor Cox has made an important contribution to constitutional theory. He provides an answer to critics who consider antidemocratic a
Court that relies on values not tied to the text of the Constitution. 133 To point
127. See ROLE, supra note 1, at 117.
128. Role of Congress, supra note 54, at 221; see New Dimensions, supra note 28, at 823.
129. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
130. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2928 (1976) (plurality opinion by Stewart, Powell &
Stevens, JJ.).
131. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
132. See also note 114 supra.
133. See, e.g., Bork, NeutralPrinciplesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. l,
6 (1971):
[N]o argument that is both coherent and respectable can be made supporting a
Supreme Court that "chooses fundamental values" because a Court that makes rather
than implements value choices cannot be squared with the presuppositions of a
democratic society. The man who understands the issues and nevertheless insists upon
the rightness of the Warren Court's performance ought also, if he is candid, to admit
that he is prepared to sacrifice democratic process to his own moral views. . ..
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in response to Cox's admittedly qualified scheme of restraints would merely
suggest that the Court will often refrain from choosing values that the critics
find objectionable, not that it always will. In Cox's framework there would
undeniably be an extratextual moral ingredient in some of the Court's
constitutional decisions, but it would not derive from the personal politics or
morality of the Justices. Instead, it would result from their considered
judgment on what values have deep enough roots in the society to warrant
recognition in constitutional adjudication without explicit amendment. A
Court operating on such a basis and invoking value premises with which one
disagrees may be operating legitimately but mistakenly, just as it may when
simply attempting to construe language. One thus disappointed by the Court's
constitutional value choices need not see evasion or revolution as his only
choices; he may maintain that the Court should realize that his own values are
so widely and deeply shared that its decisions should not traverse them. If
such a critic's judgment is truly and lastingly correct, the Court will
eventually change to adopt it, just as the Court responded to strong indications
of social consensus in Gregg v. Georgia 34 and West Coast Hotel Co. v.
35
Parrish.1
To put it another way, the objection of the critic to injection of
extratextual values is not that the adoption of a policy he opposes is
necessarily illegitimate. It is that his loss on novel policy or value groundsin
court is illegitimate because it is antidemocratic. In response, Cox offers an
explanation of how in theory and practice the judiciary can legitimately base
decisions on such grounds with a foundation for those decisions that is
fundamentally democratic. He does not rely on authority backed by force, and
he does not try to justify the imposition of individual value preferences
through adjudication. 13 6 He relies instead on a Court retaining the assent of
Such a man occupies an impossible philosophic position. What can he say, for
instance, of a Court that does not share his politics or his morality? I can think of
nothing except the assertion that he will ignore the Court whenever he can get away
with it and overthrow it if he can.
134. 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976) (upholding constitutionality of some death penalty statutes after
creating serious doubt in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), whether capital punishment
was constitutional).
135. 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overruling "liberty of contract" doctrine, which had invalidated
much social legislation).
136. If the Court exercises the leadership role Cox accords it of not merely registering social
consensus but of "shap[ing] as well as express[ing] our national ideals," see text accompanying
note 59 supra, it seems fair to ask whether there arises an irreconcilable tension with his
democratic justification for judicial recognition of constitutional values from outside the text. If
the Court is not reflecting a social consensus but seeking instead to create one, where can the
Justices find the values upon which they base their decisions, other than within themselves? How
are they to choose when to go beyond expressing existing ideals to efforts at reshaping them? If
the Court succeeds in its attempts at leadership in such instances, has it not influenced the course
of events in ways unsanctioned by conventional sources of law andin directions society might
well not have chosen by majoritarian processes?
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the people because in the long run they accept its ends and means. If they do
not, they retain the orderly means in the last analysis to do something about it.
One should not expect a confession of error from the critics of the
Court's reliance on values not tied to the text of the Constitution' 37 or a change
in the constitutional philosophy of Mr. Justice Rehnquist;138 too many serious
grounds exist for genuine disagreement about matters as fundamental as those
Cox addresses. Nevertheless, even for those who cannot agree with him, his
patient development of a constitutional theory insisting on the appropriateness of restrained, principled, and scrupulous reference to social mores
should stand as a significant intellectual achievement. Cox has shown us how
the judiciary can, on the basis of a coherent theory, act to bring constitutional
law into harmony with developing notions of justice. At the same time, he has
reminded us that the essential work of building a just and humane democratic
society must proceed from the people.
Parenthetically, even an irreconcilable contradiction between such a judicial leadership role
and Cox's democratic protestations would not justify rejection of all judicial reference to social
values outside the constitutional text. The legitimacy of drawing on extratextual sources is
essential to Cox's overall approach, and much of his achievement is in his justification of the
practice. Regardless of the importance Cox himself may attach to judicial initiative in shaping
national values, such leadership is not at all a necessary corollary of reference to social
consensus. A judge who views the judicial function more modestly than Cox could still feel
justified in looking to social mores, yet bound to stop short of trying to shape them on his own.
Yet the sort of judicial initiative Cox apparently would legitimate need not always be
undemocratic. Candid recognition by the Court that it is venturing onto uncertain ground could
lead it to choose carefully the ways in which it provides leadership so as to minimize conflict with
democratic theory and with the political branches--even, indeed, to test its value perceptions by
allowing for response from the people's representatives. The Court can, for example, construe
statutes to avoid constitutional doubts, see, e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring), or invalidate statutes on constitutional grounds that do not foreclose
the possibility of redrafted legislation, such as some forms of equal protection deprivations, see,
e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring), or first amendment overbreadth, see, e.g., Note, supra note 16, at 845. Moreover,
there always remain such important democratic constraints as the political appointment process
and society's willingness to accept the Court's initiatives.
137. See generally Bork, supra note 133.
138. See generally Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEXAS L. REv. 693
(1976).
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